MIAMI, FL â Engineers working on the failed Florida International University pedestrian bridge should have 'immediately' ordered traffic be stopped and the structure shored when an inspection was conducted hours before the March 2018 collapse that killed six people, including a bridge worker and five others, according to a report by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
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'FIGG Bridge Engineers .. the Engineer of Record .. failed to recognize that the bridge was in danger of collapsing when it inspected it hours before the collapse,' the report said. 'The concrete truss had developed numerous wide and deep structural cracks jeopardizing the integrity of the bridge. The EOR should have immediately instructed that the bridge be shored at appropriate locations and SW 8th Street be closed.'
The 115-page report was prepared by Mohammad Ayub, director of the office of engineering services within OSHA's Directorate of Construction. It was released Tuesday.
FIU declined to comment on the report, pointing to an ongoing investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board. 'Given the ongoing NTSB investigation, FIU is not in a position to comment at this time,' FIU spokeswoman Madeline Baró told Patch Wednesday.
Students and faculty of FIU recently marked the one-year anniversary of the bridge collapse with a moment of silence. Eight other people were injured in the tragedy.
Photographs released earlier by the National Transportation Safety Board showed large cracks that had been documented in the pedestrian bridge days before the massive structure came crashing down.
The 174-foot-long main span failed on March 15, 2018 not long after the main 950-ton main span of the bridge was lifted from its temporary supports, rotated 90 degrees across the eight-lane road and lowered into its permanent position in a matter of hours over busy SW 8th Street.
'The bridge had structural design deficiencies that contributed to the collapse,' the OSHA report concluded. 'The cracks on the bridge occurred due to deficient structural design.'
On the morning of the collapse, the engineer of record held a meeting after evaluating the cracks over the course of two days but did not know why the cracks were occurring.
'Despite these admissions and the knowledge that the cracks were growing in size, EOR stated more than once that the cracks did not present any safety concerns,' the report said, referring to the engineer of record.
The report also blamed Munilla Construction Management, the design-build contractor, for not notifying the engineer of record that the cracks had gotten larger since they were initially spotted.
Moreover, the report was critical of Networking Engineering Serivces Inc. The firm was doing business as Bolton Perez and Associates Inc., which served as the construction engineer and inspector for the project.
'With intimate knowledge of extensive cracking on the bridge, BPA [Bolton Perez and Associates] failed to recognize that the bridge was in danger of collapsing, and did not recommend to FIU, MCM or others to close the street and shore the bridge, regardless of the opinion' held by the engineer of record, the report said.
OSHA said the bridge truss was designed in a manner that was non redundant and 'if one diagonal member failed, the entire bridge could collapse.'
The report noted that 'given the nature and extent of the cracking and the non-redundancy of the bridge design, necessary safety precautions should have included closing the roadway below the bridge and immediately providing shoring to the bridge at suitable locations until a complete evaluation was done.'
Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part I
Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part I
Multiple Fatalities After Pedestrian Bridge Collapses Near Florida International Universityhttps://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Pedestrian-Bri..
Quote:
As investigators continue to search the site of a deadly collapse involving a 950-ton pedestrian bridge near Florida International University in Miami Thursday, officials say the death toll has risen.
Early Friday morning, the Miami-Dade Police Department confirmed that six people have died as a result of the collapse..
Early Friday morning, the Miami-Dade Police Department confirmed that six people have died as a result of the collapse..
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National Transportation Safety Board members inspecting the collapsed pedestrian bridge on March 16
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Date | March 15, 2018 |
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Time | 1:47 p.m. EDT |
Location | University Park and Sweetwater, Florida, U.S. |
Type | Bridge collapse |
Deaths | 6 |
Non-fatal injuries | 8 |
On March 15, 2018, a 175-foot-long (53 m), recently-made section of the FIU-Sweetwater UniversityCitypedestrian bridge collapsed onto the Tamiami Trail (U.S. Route 41), resulting in six deaths, eight injuries, and eight vehicles being crushed underneath.[1][2]
The initial construction on the pedestrian bridge was located in front of the campus of FIU in University Park, a suburb west of Miami, Florida, United States, and was in the process of post-tension rod adjustment when it suddenly failed.[3] The road beneath it had been opened to traffic.
An examination carried out by the Federal Highway Administration discovered faults in the design of the bridge, which overestimated the strength of the bridge in the region which failed, and underestimated the load it would be expected to carry.[4]
- 4Collapse
Background[edit]
The FIU Sweetwater UniversityCity pedestrian Bridge, located just west of the intersection of Tamiami Trail (Southwest 8th Street) and Southwest 109th Avenue,[5] was planned to connect the FIU campus to student housing neighborhoods in Sweetwater.[6] It was intended to improve pedestrian safety, as the busy crosswalks at this wide, busy intersection had been identified as a safety hazard and the site of fatal collisions.[7] The $14.2 million project was funded with a $19.4 million Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grant from the United States Department of Transportation in 2013, along with state agencies.[8] The bridge itself cost $9 million to construct.[9]
The main companies behind the construction project are Munilla Construction Management (MCM), a Miami-based construction management firm, and FIGG Bridge Engineers, a Tallahassee-based firm.[10] Unlike most bridges in Florida, the design for this project was overseen by the university itself, not the Florida Department of Transportation.
Florida International University is known for its expertise in accelerated bridge construction, and has attracted international scholars as PhD students. It is home to the federally-funded Accelerated Bridge Construction University Transportation Center, which sponsors industry conferences and seminars.[11][12]
Bridge layout[edit]
Elevation Engineering Drawing of Proposed FIU Sweetwater Pedestrian Bridge
The full 320-foot-long (98 m) pedestrian bridge was to cross both a major roadway and a parallel water canal with two separate spans connected at a faux cable-stay tower. The main roadway-crossing span was 175 ft long, the shorter canal span was to be 99 ft long. An elevator and stairs at the south end added 31 ft, and at the north end, 15 feet, for a total bridge length of 320 feet.[13] At the bridge site, the Tamiami Trail roadway has seven lanes of traffic plus one turn lane.[2] The main span was rolled into place and set on support columns on March 10, five days before the collapse. The canal span, access ramps, and faux cable-stay tower had not yet been built. Pedestrian use was to begin when the whole project was complete. The school was on spring break at the time of collapse.[3] The section of the bridge that collapsed weighed 950 short tons (860 metric tons) and fell onto several vehicles on the roadway below.
Bridge construction and design[edit]
Construction of the bridge began in March 2016 and was scheduled to be completed in December 2018.[9][14] The bridge's main span was assembled adjacent to the highway using accelerated bridge construction (ABC), a technique promoted at the university.[3] It was lifted into place on the morning of March 10, five days before the collapse, during a weekend closure of the highway.[15][16]
FIU-Sweetwater UniversityCity Bridge
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Coordinates | 25°45â²40â³N80°22â²22â³W / 25.7612°N 80.3728°WCoordinates: 25°45â²40â³N80°22â²22â³W / 25.7612°N 80.3728°W |
Carries | Pedestrian traffic |
Crosses | Tamiami Trail |
Locale | University Park and Sweetwater, Florida, U.S. |
Characteristics | |
Total length | 320 feet (98 m) |
Longest span | 175 feet (53 m) |
History | |
Engineering design by | FIGG Bridge Engineers |
Constructed by | Munilla Construction Management |
Construction cost | $14.2 million |
Collapsed | March 15, 2018 |
Location in Florida
University Park (the United States)
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The new pedestrian bridge was designed to connect the campus to student housing in a dramatic sculptural way, and also to showcase the school's leadership in the ABC method of rapid bridge construction.[17][18]
The bridge was a post-tensioned concrete structure.[17] Concrete structures are generally 10 times heavier than equivalent steel designs.[19] The bridge was made using a new formulation for concrete intended to stay cleaner than standard concrete formulations.[20] In the main bridge span, the concrete floor deck, roof, and diagonal struts each contained post-tensioning cables whose compressive effect on the concrete could be adjusted after the concrete was cured.[17] Adjustments were expected each time the span was moved onto a different foundation with different support points.
The full bridge project was styled to look like a cable-stayed bridge, with a pylon tower and high cables for dramatic effect. But functionally and structurally it was actually a truss bridge, with the spans being fully self-supporting.[17][21][22] The bridge spans used a novel concrete truss design invented for this project, a 're-invented I-beam concept'. Concrete truss bridges are rarely constructed, and few exist.[23] The vertical web of the beam was a series of triangulated concrete diagonal struts along the centerline, and the diagonal angles of the struts varied across the bridge so they would align with pipes from the center pylon, in the eventual faux cable-stayed appearance.[24]
A specification change from FDOT late in the planning phase required relocating both piers of the main span 11 feet (3 meters) north to allow for a future light rail right-of-way near the canal, causing some changes in construction.[25]
The concrete walkway deck was to act as the horizontal bottom flange of a wide I-beam, and the concrete roof canopy was to function as the horizontal top flange of the I-beam.[17] The walkway was thus nearer to ground level than in a standard design where the walkway is placed on top of the structural support system.[17] This reduced the number of steps to climb. The deck carries the entire weight of the bridge span, as a tension load.
The canopy carries the structure's main compressive loads. The diagonal struts carry either compression or tension forces, depending on their angle and position. The struts contain post-tensioning rods that connect the flanges, and are adjusted as needed.[26] VSL was the company contracted for the post tensioning of the new bridge. Post-tensioning of a diagonal member may be one of the reasons for the structural failure of the FIU bridge. Concrete is much more prone to crack than steel in trusses.[27] Certain cracks could compromise the cable/rod anchorings, making failure inevitable when the post-tensioning operation began.[28]
Fiu Bridge Collapse Cause Diversity
The bridge was meant to last more than 100 years, and to withstand a Category 5 hurricane, according to a statement by the university.[29]
Collapse[edit]
Schematic of the bridge. Green: collapsed parts, Blue: not installed at the time of the collapse. The diagonal beam that was undergoing post-tension cable/rod adjustment at the time of the collapse is highlighted in red.
Reports of cracking[edit]
Two days before the collapse, on March 13, the third day after lifting of the main span, the project's lead engineer discovered cracks at the north end of the span (the end that later broke). He reported this by voicemail to a Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) employee. He thought this was not an immediate safety issue, merely something that would need to be repaired later.[30] The FDOT recipient was away for several days and did not hear this message until the day after the collapse.[31][32]
At 9 a.m. on March 15, a university employee heard a loud 'whip cracking' sound while under the bridge span, waiting for a red traffic light.[33] At the same time, the design-build team met for about two hours at the construction site to discuss the cracks discovered on March 13. Representatives from both FIU and the FDOT were present. The FIGG lead engineer's conclusions were that the structural integrity of the bridge was not compromised and that there were no safety concerns raised by the presence of the crack.[34] FIGG also insisted that no crack repairs should be carried out until the stabilizing of the node and pylon diaphragm with post-tensioning was completed.[35]
The mayor of Miami-Dade County, Carlos A. Giménez, said that workers conducted a stress test on the morning of March 15.[36]
Collapse[edit]
At 1:47 p.m. on March 15, the north end of the installed bridge span sagged deeply as the first diagonal fractured, folded, and immediately dropped the heavy full span onto the roadway below. A surveillance video shows the collapse sequence took only a few video frames.[37]
United States Senator and FIU adjunct professor Marco Rubiotweeted that engineers were tightening loosened cables on March 15:[36] Workers were adding more tension to the steel rod (tendon) inside a concrete diagonal strut at the north end.[31] The National Transportation Safety Board, who are investigating the collapse, stated that crews were applying 'post-tensioning force' on the bridge before the collapse.[38]
The tensioning rod that was being tightened at the time of the collapse, with a hydraulic tensioning machine (blue) still attached to its end, extends from the canopy in the upper left of this image.
As the post-tensioning operation by the VSL company was being carried out on bridge diagonal member support #11, the bottom joint (which contains the anchor nut for the post-tensioning rod) apparently failed explosively, causing the bridge to collapse. Currently, it remains unknown why the joint may have failed, although post-tensioning remains a likely contributor.[39]
The span that collapsed weighed 950 short tons (861 tonnes).[40]
Deaths[edit]
The event killed six people: one construction worker and five people sitting in cars at a stoplight below.[41]
At the time of the collapse, the roadway was open and multiple cars were stopped at a traffic light under the span.[42][43] A driver who survived the collapse reported that small rocks fell onto her car just before the front of her car was crushed.[44] A worker saved himself when he heard cracking and locked his safety harness just before the collapse.[45] Eight cars were crushed.[46] Six people were killed and eight others were injured.[1][47][46] Five of the victims were killed immediately when the bridge fell; one died at the hospital. An employee of VSL, Navaro Brown, 37, worked for the company contracted to apply post-tensioning and died in the collapse. Two other employees of the company were hospitalized. The other deceased victims of the tragedy were Alberto Arias, 53, Brandon Brownfield, 39, FIU student Alexa Duran, 18, Rolando Fraga, 60, and Oswaldo Gonzalez, 57.[48][49][50]
Subsequent events[edit]
Southwest 8th Street between Southwest 107th and 117th Avenues was closed until March 24 while the debris was cleared.[51]
A team of 15 people from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) began their investigation on the morning of March 16.[52] On March 19, 2018 the first civil lawsuit was filed against Figg Bridge Engineers, MCM, Bolton Perez & Associates, the project's consulting engineer, Louis Berger, and Network Engineering Services for reckless negligence.[53]
Inquiry[edit]
Members of the NTSB's Go Team for the investigation boarding an FAA plane to travel to Miami.
On March 15, 2018 the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) launched a Go-team to investigate the bridge collapse. The accident number assigned is HWY18MH009.[54] On March 16, 2018 the NTSB Investigators held their first press conference to discuss the inquiry into the bridge collapse. Noteworthy points from the meeting included a statement that the inquiry was in the very early stages, that cracks in the bridge superstructure did not necessarily make the bridge unsafe, that on-site investigations would take about a week, that preserving perishable evidence was crucial, and that bridge workers were applying a 'post-tensioning force' on the bridge before the failure.[55] Also on March 16, 2018 the FDOT released a letter to the public with information about the bridge collapse:
According to standard procedures, FDOT issued a permit at the request of FIU's design build team to close SW 8th Street during the installation of the FIU pedestrian bridge on Saturday, March 10. While FDOT has issued, following a request from the FIU design build team, a blanket permit allowing for two-lane closures effective from January through April, at no time, from installation until the collapse of the bridge, did FDOT receive a request to close the entire road. The department was also not made aware by the FIU design build team of any scheduled 'stress testing' of the bridge following installation and has no knowledge or confirmation from FIU's design build team of 'stress testing' occurring since installation. Per standard safety procedure, FDOT would issue a permit for partial or full road closure if deemed necessary and requested by the FIU design build team or FIU contracted construction inspector for structural testing.
Additional, in the interest of full transparency, FDOT is today releasing the transcript of a voicemail left on a landline on Tuesday, March 13, by W. Denney Pate, FIGG's lead engineer responsible for the FIU pedestrian bridge project. The transcription is below .. :
'Hey Tom, this is Denney Pate with FIGG bridge engineers. Calling to, uh, share with you some information about the FIU pedestrian bridge and some cracking that's been observed on the north end of the span, the pylon end of that span we moved this weekend. Um, so, uh, we've taken a look at it and, uh, obviously some repairs or whatever will have to be done but from a safety perspective we don't see that there's any issue there so we're not concerned about it from that perspective although obviously the cracking is not good and something's going to have to be, ya know, done to repair that. At any rate, I wanted to chat with you about that because I suspect at some point that's gonna get to your desk. So, uh, at any rate, call me back when you can. Thank you. Bye.'
This voicemail was left on a landline and not heard by an FDOT employee until Friday, March 16 as the employee was out of the office on assignment.
On Wednesday, March 14, Alfredo Reyna, the Assistant LAP Coordinator and an FDOT consultant, received a phone call from Rafeal Urdaneta, a Bolton Perez & Associates employee, notifying him of a midday meeting scheduled for Thursday, March 15 with W. Denney Pate and other members of the FIU design build team that are responsible for the project. FDOT is routinely included in meetings during LAP project construction. Reyna attended the meeting which occurred shortly before the bridge failure and collapse and was not notified of any life-safety issues, need for additional road closures or requests for any other assistance from FDOT.
The responsibility to identify and address life-safety issues and properly communicate them is the sole responsibility of the FIU design build team. At no point during any of the communications above did FIGG or any member of the FIU design build team ever communicate a life-safety issue. Again, FIGG and the FIU design build team never alerted FDOT of any life-safety issue regarding the FIU pedestrian bridge prior to collapse. (bold in original)
The tragic failure and collapse of the pedestrian bridge at FIU is the subject of an active and ongoing investigation led by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as well as local and state law enforcement investigations. As FDOT assists in these investigations, we will continue our internal review and release all pertinent information as quickly as possible while ensuring its accuracy.[56]
On March 21, 2018 the NTSB sent out a press release detailing the items from the collapse that required further examination at the Turner Fairbank Highway Research Center, in McLean, Virginia. They also confirmed workers were adjusting rod tension when the collapse occurred.[57]
On May 23, 2018 the NTSB released a preliminary report titled 'Highway: Collapse of Pedestrian Bridge Under Construction Miami, Florida (HWY18MH009)' which summarized the accident. They said they are evaluating the emergence of cracks in the region of diagonal members 2 (south end of the bridge) and 11 (north end of bridge), and the propagation of cracks in the region of diagonal member 11. Pictures of the cracks from February 24 (before the walkway had been moved into place) were also given.[2]
Consulting engineers, Bolton-Perez and Associates, had taken several pictures of severe cracks in diagonal member 11 and adjacent to vertical member 12 which had appeared when the bridge was moved into place on March 10.[46][58]
The Turner-Fairbanks Highway Research Center, at the request of the NTSB, tested samples of steel and concrete from the collapsed bridge, and found that they met the project requirements. The NTSB similarly asked the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to examine the design of the bridge. The FHWA examination discovered that the bridge designers had overestimated the strength of one section of the bridge - at the point where the diagonal member 11 and vertical member 12 met the bridge deck - and underestimated the load that that same section would carry.[4]
In June 2019, OSHA released its final report on the FIU bridge collapse [59] and concluded FIGG bridge engineers failed to recognize collapse was imminent when they inspected the bridge hours earlier. They also concluded the bridge had structural design deficiencies, severe cracks were wrongly ignored by the Engineer of Record and warranted street closure, and contract bridge design experts violated basic FDOT construction requirements.
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Legal action[edit]
On March 21, 2018 U.S. Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao asked the department's inspector general to probe whether a federally funded UniversityCity pedestrian bridge complied with all rules.[60] A subsequent internal memorandum from the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation, dated March 22, 2018 expressed concerns the project complied with Federal specifications, and that the objective of an audit will be to assess whether the Florida International University pedestrian bridge met Federal and DOT requirements for the TIGER application, approval, and grant agreement processes[61]
On March 28, 2018 the Miami Herald reported they were denied access to FIU documents related to the bridge construction, citing federal regulations that prevent release of non-public information related to the bridge construction and design project when an NTSB investigation is in progress. A lawyer for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press indicated more information should be released under the Florida Sunshine Law, due to intense public interest in the collapse.[62] On May 2, 2018, the Miami Herald filed a lawsuit against FDOT in Florida's Leon County Circuit Court to compel the FDOT to release emails, meeting minutes and other records relating to the bridge's design and construction.[63] On May 3, 2018, a lawyer for the NTSB wrote a letter to Judge Cooper of the 2nd Judicial Circuit of Florida in Tallahassee, FL urging the court to deny a ruling that would favor the Miami Herald plaintiff, for the release of any bridge information generated after a February 19, 2018 cutoff date.[64]
On May 7, 2018 the Miami Herald reported they had received a copy of a memo with photographs from FIU dated February 28, 2018 that had been sent to the Munilla Construction Management company, the bridge project's builder. The memo, which has since been rescinded back from Public view, purportedly urged the bridge engineer to respond to their concerns about significant cracks in the concrete joint at connection between the No. 11 truss and the bridge deck.[65]
On June 4, 2018 Judge Cooper declined to dismiss the Miami Herald case (which had requested more public information) and asked that the NTSB first be given the option of joining the lawsuit either as an amicus (friend of the court) or as a defendant.[66]
On June 15, 2018 U.S. Attorney Christopher P. Canova sent a letter to Judge Cooper to request that any rulings in the pending case be delayed until the federal government is able to determine if it should file a statement of interest.[67]
On June 27, 2018 the Travelers Indemnity Company and The Phoenix Insurance Company submitted an 18-page complaint for declaratory relief in U.S. District Court for Florida Southern District, Miami Division. The lawsuit filing seeks to avoid financial liability to the claimants and included the following statement: 'There is no coverage under Travelers' and Phoenix's policies issued to Figg for any damages caused by the joint venture and/or partnership between Figg and MCM, as such joint venture and/or partnership was never disclosed to Travelers and Phoenix and does not qualify as an insured under either of the Policies issued to Figg.'[68]
On July 26, 2018 the case before Circuit Judge John Cooper was still waiting for Canova's office to file a notice about participating. The case was reassigned to Circuit Judge Kevin Carroll from Judge Cooper.[69]
On July 30, 2018 the NTSB filed a statement of intent supporting the state's motion to dismiss the case. On the following day, Judge Carroll asked all parties to prepare for a ruling later in the week, as he weighed Federal and State law arguments.[70]
On August 21, 2018 Leon County Circuit Judge Kevin Carroll ruled the FDOT 'shall produce to The Herald the requested records, but that production shall be limited to records from February 20th to March 15th (prior to the collapse)'.[71] However, two days later and just as the FDOT was about to release documents, the Florida State ruling was temporarily blocked by U.S. District Court Judge William Stafford on a request from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Florida (on behalf of the NTSB, who is seeking to move the case to a Federal Court).[72] On October 5, Federal Judge Stafford made a final ruling to block the requested documents.[73]
The following is from a September 18, 2018 OSHA News Release - Region 4: The U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) on Friday, September 14, cited multiple contractors for safety violations after one employee suffered fatal injuries and five other employees sustained serious injuries when a pedestrian bridge at the Florida International University campus in Miami collapsed. The five companies collectively received seven violations, totaling $86,658 in proposed penalties. OSHA cited Figg Bridge Engineers Inc., a civil and structural engineering company; Network Engineering Services Inc. (doing business as Bolton Perez & Assoc.), a construction engineering and inspection firm; Structural Technologies LLC (doing business as Structural Technologies/VSL), specializing in post-tensioning in bridges and buildings; Munilla Construction Management LLC, a bridge and building construction company; and The Structural Group of South Florida Inc., a contractor specializing in concrete formwork.[74]
A total of 18 civil lawsuits were filed against 25 businesses connected to the failed FIU bridge project. Miami-Dade Circuit Judge Jennifer Bailey is overseeing the on-going case.[75]
On March 1, 2019 Munilla Construction Management, the main Miami-based contractor behind the pedestrian bridge construction, announced a restructuring and recapitalization of the Company through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition plan of reorganization. [76] The company reached a settlement deal with the victims and their families on May 2, 2019 that would pay up to $42 million.[77]
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- ^ abShapiro, Emily; Doom, Justin (March 16, 2018). 'Bridge collapse death toll likely to rise as investigators sift through rubble'. ABC News. Retrieved March 16, 2018.
- ^ abc'Preliminary Report- Highway: Collapse of Pedestrian Bridge Under Construction Miami, Florida (HWY18MH009)'. NTSB. Retrieved May 27, 2018.
- ^ abcViglucci, Andres; Madan, Monique O.; Hanks, Douglas; Chang, Daniel (March 15, 2018). 'At least 4 dead in catastrophic FIU pedestrian bridge collapse; 9 rescued from rubble'. Miami Herald. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- ^ ab'NTSB Issues 2nd Investigative Update in FIU Bridge Collapse Investigation'. NTSB. November 15, 2018. Retrieved November 17, 2018.
- ^'FIU Bridge Collapse: Four Dead, 8 Cars Trapped Underneath'. CBS Miami. March 15, 2018. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^Ashaboglu, Selin (March 15, 2018). 'Miami Pedestrian Bridge Collapses'. ARCHITECT. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- ^Rodriguez, Marybel (August 22, 2017). 'Pedestrian Bridge In The Works For FIU Students To Cross Busy 8th Street'. CBS 4 Miami. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- ^'FIU Pedestrian Bridge Construction Using Innovative Approach By Swinging Into Place'. CBSLocal. WFOR-TV. March 10, 2018. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- ^ abHarris, Alex (August 24, 2017). 'A walking bridge for FIU students is coming soon. But it's too late for one student'. Miami Herald. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- ^Gomez Licon, Adriana; Replogle, Josh (March 16, 2018). 'Tearful families wait as bodies remain under failed bridge'. Associated Press. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^Bridge Collapse Saps Spirits and Research Efforts at Florida International University, By PATRICIA MAZZEI and STEPHANIE SAUL, New York Times, March 17, 2018
- ^'Home - Accelerated Bridge Construction'. Accelerated Bridge Construction. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
- ^'General Plan and Elevation'(PDF). Florida International University. Retrieved March 23, 2018.
- ^Kiah, Clara-Meretan (March 30, 2016). 'FIU, Sweetwater break ground for bridge to the future'. Florida International University. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- ^Viglucci, Andres (March 10, 2018). ''Instant' bridge aims to make a dangerous crossing safer for thousands of students'. Miami Herald. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- ^Madan, Monique O. (March 8, 2018). 'If you plan to drive on SW Eighth Street this weekend, you'll be rerouted here'. Miami Herald. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- ^ abcdefMCM. 'MCM design-build proposal'(PDF). Retrieved March 18, 2018.
- ^Tylin International (May 6, 2015). 'Design Criteria, FIU-UniversityCity Prosperity Project - Pedestrian Bridge'(PDF).
- ^Staletovich, Jenny; Rodriguez, Rene; Flechas, Joey. 'Stress test may have contributed to collapse of FIU pedestrian bridge'. Retrieved March 18, 2018.
- ^News, F. I. U. (March 10, 2018). '#DidYouKnow the new pedestrian bridge that will connect our FIU and the @CitySweetwater is the first in the world to be constructed entirely of self-cleaning concrete? #WorldsAheadpic.twitter.com/lQVJh09Pv2'. @FIUnews. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^Jansen, Bart (March 16, 2018). 'Miami bridge that collapsed was a truss design, despite the cosmetic tower, support cables'. USA Today. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^FIU Bridge Collapse NTSB Update. Robert Accetta (press briefing speaker). WSVN-TV. March 16, 2018. Retrieved March 19, 2018 â via YouTube.CS1 maint: others (link)
- ^Bridgehunter. 'concrete truss bridges'. Retrieved March 21, 2018.
- ^'Miami bridge that collapsed was a truss design, despite the cosmetic tower, support cables'. Retrieved April 27, 2018.
- ^Jason Dearen and Jennifer Kay. 'Key design change stymied bridge cost, schedule'. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
- ^Jennifer Kay and Allen G. Breed (March 18, 2018). 'Bridge collapse victim's uncle rages at 'incompetence''. Chicago Tribune. Archived from the original on March 18, 2018. Retrieved March 18, 2018.
- ^'Pedestrian bridge collapse in Miami, Florida ..' Retrieved March 20, 2018.
- ^'A Bridge Too Faux: Florida's Pedestrian Bridge Would Only Have Looked Safe'. Retrieved March 20, 2018.
- ^'Collapsed bridge meant to last 100 years'.
- ^Judy, Scott; Korman, Richard (May 24, 2018). 'Investigators Explain Focus On Pre-Collapse Cracking In Florida Bridge'. ENRSoutheast. BNP Media. Retrieved May 25, 2018.
- ^ abCNN, Madison Park, Jason Hanna, Joe Sutton and Steve Almasy,. 'Engineer advised of cracking on bridge two days before collapse'. CNN. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^'Bridge collapse victim's uncle rages at 'incompetence''.
- ^'FIU employee heard a loud crack crossing under the bridge. Hours later, it collapsed'. miamiherald. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^Mier, Alyse (March 17, 2018). 'FIU statement' (Press release). FIU. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^'FIGG Structural Analysis Presentation'(PDF). FDOT. March 15, 2018. p. 3. Retrieved May 25, 2019.
- ^ ab'Rubio says engineers were tightening loose cables when the FIU bridge collapsed'. miamiherald. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^'Miami bridge collapsed during 'stress testing' killing at least four'. Mail Online. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^'Bridge victim's grieving uncle lashes out at 'incompetence''. AP News. Retrieved March 18, 2018.
- ^Smale, Katherine. 'Experts cite explosive joint failure as cause of Florida bridge collapse'. New Civil Engineer. Retrieved March 21, 2018.
- ^Cochrane, Karen (March 16, 2018). 'Pedestrian Bridge FAQ' (Press release). FIU. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^'FIU had grand plans for 'signature' bridge. But the design had a key mistake, experts say'.
- ^Svrluga, Susan; Siddiqui, Faiz (March 15, 2018). 'New pedestrian bridge collapses at Florida International University, crushing eight cars driving underneath'. The Washington Post. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- ^Batchelor, Amanda; Suarez, Carlos (March 15, 2018). 'Several dead after newly-installed portion of FIU pedestrian bridge collapses'. Local 10 News. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- ^'At least 4 dead in catastrophic FIU pedestrian bridge collapse; 9 rescued from rubble'. miamiherald. Retrieved March 21, 2018.
- ^News, A. B. C. (March 16, 2018). 'Worker hurt in bridge collapse thinks locking in harness saved his life: Cousin'. ABC News. Retrieved March 22, 2018.
- ^ abc'NTSB News Release 8/9/2018'. NTSB. August 9, 2018. Retrieved January 20, 2019.
- ^'Florida Bridge Collapse Moves Into Investigation Phase'. The Wall Street Journal. March 18, 2018. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
- ^'Bridge worker Navaro Brown died in collapse of FIU span, company says'. Retrieved March 20, 2018.
- ^Mazzei, Patricia; Robles, Frances; Dickerson, Caitlin (March 16, 2018). 'They Were Heading Home, to Lunch, to Work. Then a Bridge Came Crashing Down'. The New York Times. Retrieved March 18, 2018.
- ^'New video surfaces of FIU bridge collapse from view of driver who witnessed it'.
- ^'SW 8th Street Reopens To Traffic After Bridge Collapse'. CBS Miami. March 24, 2018. Retrieved March 31, 2018.
- ^Bowden, John (March 15, 2018). 'NTSB chairman: Agency will investigate Florida bridge collapse'. The Hill. Retrieved March 16, 2018.
- ^Martin Vassolo. 'Survivor of FIU bridge collapse sues design-construction firms'. miamiherald. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
- ^NTSB (March 15, 2018). 'Pedestrian bridge collapse'. Retrieved March 19, 2018.
- ^Jennifer Kay and Allen G. Breed (March 17, 2018). 'Authorities are investigating whether reported cracking contributed to the collapse of a Florida bridge that killed 6 people'. Business Insider. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^http://www.fdot.gov/info/CO/news/newsreleases/default.shtm
- ^https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20180321.aspx
- ^'INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE'(PDF). NTSB. August 9, 2018. Retrieved March 21, 2019.
- ^https://www.osha.gov/doc/engineering/pdf/2019_r_03.pdf
- ^Editorial, Reuters. 'U.S. Transportation Secretary seeks probe of fatal Florida bridge ..'
- ^https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/Audit%20Announcment%20-%20DOT%E2%80%99s%20Oversight%20of%20Pedestrian%20Bridge%20Project%5E3-22-18.pdf
- ^'Two weeks ago, FIU's bridge abruptly collapsed. Here's what we know so far'. Retrieved April 27, 2018.
- ^http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article210298454.html
- ^https://cloudup.com/cW7td9cgf3o
- ^http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article210449384.html
- ^https://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2018/06/05/florida-officials-ask-judge-to-block-release-of-records-on-collapsed-fiu-bridge
- ^http://floridapolitics.com/archives/266761-feds-weigh-entering-lawsuit
- ^https://flarecord.com/stories/511472990-insurers-ask-federal-court-to-drop-them-from-covering-engineering-firm-in-pedestrian-bridge-collapse
- ^http://floridapolitics.com/archives/270000-feds-mia-fiu-bridge
- ^https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article215833630.html
- ^https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4779315-Order-1.html
- ^https://www.bradenton.com/news/state/florida/article217192670.html
- ^https://www.bradenton.com/news/state/florida/article219564830.html
- ^https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/region4/09182018
- ^https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Victims-Father-Frustrated-As-FIU-Bridge-Litigation-Drags-On-506127781.html
- ^https://www.mcm-us.com/news/mcm-reorganizing-under-chapter-11#.XHschYg3nmE
- ^https://www.bradenton.com/news/state/florida/article229972044.html
External links[edit]
- NTSB Chairman Robert Sumwalt briefs media on the Miami, FL bridge collapse investigation, March 16, 2018, NTSB
- Computer animation showing the assembly of the FIU pedestrian bridge, MCM - Munilla Construction Management
- Rendering of FIU Pedestrian Bridge, MCM - Munilla Construction Management
- Time-lapse of the FIU-Sweetwater UniversityCity Bridge construction, Florida International University
- An initial rendering of the bridge. Actual location is an opposite side of Southwest 109th Avenue, Florida International University
- Accelerated Bridge Construction, University Transportation Center, Florida International University
Retrieved from 'https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Florida_International_University_pedestrian_bridge_collapse&oldid=902944152'
Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part VIII
Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part VIII
A continuation of our discussion of this failure. Best to read the other threads first to avoid rehashing things already discussed.
Part I
thread815-436595: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part I
Part II
thread815-436699: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part II
Part III
thread815-436802: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part III
Part IV
thread815-436924: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part IV
Part V
thread815-437029: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part V
Part VI
thread815-438451: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part VI
Part VII
thread815-438966: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part VII
Check out Eng-Tips Forum's Policies here:
FAQ731-376: Eng-Tips.com Forum Policies
Part I
thread815-436595: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part I
Part II
thread815-436699: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part II
Part III
thread815-436802: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part III
Part IV
thread815-436924: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part IV
Part V
thread815-437029: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part V
Part VI
thread815-438451: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part VI
Part VII
thread815-438966: Miami Pedestrian Bridge, Part VII
Check out Eng-Tips Forum's Policies here:
FAQ731-376: Eng-Tips.com Forum Policies
Finally, the slow cook considers the context of the meal. Will the dish be eaten immediately? Will it need to be kept warm while other dishes are being prepared? Will the dish be plated and taken to guests by servers or will it be part of a buffet? To achieve optimal taste and conviviality, the cook needs to consider the role of the servers [if any] as well as the needs of the guests
Likewise, the Slow Engineer should take into account the role of the construction workers and the public at large. When is it safe for workers to be up on a recently poured concrete structure? What tasks should they perform and when? Were the cracks in the concrete detected two days before the collapse a sign of trouble or not? In the course of adjusting the steel tension rods, should the road below the bridge have been closed to ensure public safety? Like any technological artifact, the FIU Bridge did not exist in a vacuum but rather in a social context with all sorts of people moving around it and interacting with itâand that included the occupants of cars driving underneath the bridge
In drawing this analogy between Slow Food and Slow Engineering, I am not suggesting that engineering should merely slow down, that speed is simply the enemy. Just as some dishesâsuch as grilled fishârequire speed and judgment in order to get a crispy surface while not overcooking the inside of the fish, so certain engineering tasks canâand should--be done quickly and efficiently. In certain contexts, Accelerated Bridge Construction is the appropriate technique. Instead, Slow Engineering is a holistic approach, challenging us to pay attention to the interplay of materials, techniques and context in order to create safe, sustainable and aesthetically pleasing designs.
To help students appreciate this holistic approach, I would tell them the mythic story associated with the great dining hall at New College, Oxford. The ceiling of the dining hall is supported by huge oak beams, some 2 square feet and 45 feet long. Legend has it that when New College was created in 1379, it was given forested land as part of its endowment, and over the centuries, the collegeâs foresters made sure to preserve very large oak trees. The foresters did so because they knew that, sooner or later, the beams in the dining hall would become infested with beetles, causing them to rot and would need to be replaced. While it is not clear there was ever a specific grove of oaks earmarked for the great hall, the myth conveys the importance of understanding how materials and natural processes underlie all of what we do as engineers. You canât have a great hall with massive oak beams unless you understand where the oak beams come from and how long it takes for the oak trees to grow.
The lesson of the FIU bridge is that engineers need to continue to take into account the interplay of the limits of materials, natural processes and context. At its best, Slow Engineering reminds us that human activities must align with nature rather than forcing nature to conform to our expectations.